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Summary 
Persistent and significant privately-held stockpiles of crude oil have long been an important 
empirical regularity in the United States. Such stockpiles would not rationally be held in a 
traditional Hotelling-style model. How then can the existence of these inventories be 
explained? In the presence of sufficiently stochastic prices, oil extracting firms have an 
incentive to hold inventories to smooth production over time. An alternative explanation is 
related to a speculative motive - firms hold stockpiles intending to cash in on periods of 
particularly high prices. I argue that empirical evidence supports the former but not the 
latter explanation. 
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Persistent and signiﬁcant privately-held stockpiles of crude oil have long been an im-
portant empirical regularity in the United States. Such stockpiles would not rationally
be held in a traditional Hotelling-style model. How then can the existence of these in-
ventories be explained? In the presence of sufﬁciently stochastic prices, oil extracting
ﬁrms have an incentive to hold inventories to smooth production over time. An alter-
native explanation is related to a speculative motive - ﬁrms hold stockpiles intending to
cash in on periods of particularly high prices. I argue that empirical evidence supports
the former but not the latter explanation.
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Since ofﬁcial records were ﬁrst kept in the United States (U.S.), in 1920, private interests have
consistently held signiﬁcant inventories of crude oil. Over the course of the past few decades, these
inventories have averaged around 325 million barrels. While these holdings have ﬂuctuated some
they have been remarkably persistent over the past 70 years, ranging from just over 215 million
barrels to slightly less than 398 million barrels (see Figure 1). What motivates these substantial
inventory holdings? One answer is that stockpiles could be held for speculative purposes – betting
on abnormally rapid price run-ups. An alternative explanation is that petroleum extracting ﬁrms
would like to hedge against substantial swings in extraction costs.1
Neither explanation is compelling in a deterministic setting. In a deterministic world prices
would have to rise at the rate of interest to induce ﬁrms to hold stockpiles. But if prices increased at
the rate of interest, rents would typically rise faster than the interest rate. Firms would then prefer
to delay extraction, so that there would be no fodder from which to build inventories. The answer,
I believe, must lie in ﬂuctuating prices.
Reacting to the volatile changes in petroleum prices during the past year, some key players
in OPEC and a number of members of the U.S. Congress placed the blame on speculators. One
issue left unanswered in this dialog was the role of privately held inventories. If speculation was
at play, one would expect resource inventory holders to cash in on abnormally high prices. As I
discuss below, while there was a negative correlation between spot prices and inventory holdings,
prices only explain a paltry amount of the variation in inventories. Indeed, inventories did not
change much even when prices increased or decreased dramatically, as during this past year. It
seems likely that some other effect played a more important role.
1An alternative, and I believe compelling, motivation is related to the concept of production
smoothing (Arrow et al. (1958), Blanchard and Fisher (1989)). If oil prices are driven by a random
process, perhaps arising from demand shocks, the induced ﬂuctuations in market price will lead to
variations in the ﬁrm’s optimal extraction rate. So long as there is enough variation in production,
relative to the overall downward trend in production that must occur for non-renewable resources,
and so long as it is costly to expand production, ﬁrms will wish to hold inventories to guard against
future cost increases. This explanation will hold true no matter what current price is, and no matter
what the current level of resources in situ.
In this paper I explore the implication of such motivations. I start by discussing the con-
ceptual underpinnings of the story in section 2, formally demonstrating that a resource extracting
ﬁrm would generally not acquire stockpiles in a deterministic world. I then analyze a version of
the model allowing for stochastic prices in section 3. I turn to an examination of the data in section
4. Here I argue that the variation in spot prices has been sufﬁcient to motivate the acquisition of
inventories for almost all months during the past two decades. By contrast, I ﬁnd that the impact
of spot prices upon both levels of and changes in privately-held oil stocks is modest at best. I
conclude with a discussion of potential extensions of the model in section 5.
2 Deterministic Prices and the Incentive to Stockpile
Consider a price-taking ﬁrm engaged in the extraction of oil. The ﬁrm in question has an initial
deposit of the resource of size R0, from which it may choose to extract. Its rate of extraction is
yt, and its rate of sales, qt, are selected to maximize the discounted ﬂow of its proﬁts. It will be
convenient to adjust the ﬁrm’s problem slightly, and use net additions to inventories, wt = yt  qt,
2as a control variable in place of sales.
The ﬁrm’s reserves at instant t are Rt and its inventory holdings are St. I assume the ﬁrm
starts with no inventories. Reserves decumulate with extraction, while inventories accumulate
according to the difference between extraction and sales:
˙ Rt =  yt; (1)
˙ St = wt: (2)
When it is actively extracting, the ﬁrm bears positive operating costs. I assume marginal
extractioncostsarepositive, upward-slopingandweaklyconvex, withbothtotalcostsandmarginal
costs decreasing in R. A simple example of a cost function that has these features is
c(y;R) = A0+A1yh=R; (3)
which is adapted from Pindyck (1980). This function, which combines ﬂow ﬁxed costs with a
power function of the rate of extraction that is proportional to the inverse of reserves, has two de-
sirable features: There is a range of falling average extraction costs, and extraction becomes more
costly the greater is the ratio of extraction to reserves; both aspects are consistent with anecdotal
evidence. In this functional form, h 1 can be interpreted as the elasticity of marginal extraction
cost with respect to the rate of extraction. The assumption of weakly convex marginal costs implies
h  2. For now, I assume that it is costless to hold inventories; the implications of relaxing this
assumption are discussed below.
3Denoting the market price of oil at instant t by Pt, the instantaneous rate of proﬁts is
pt = Pt[yt  wt] c(yt;Rt): (4)
The goal is to select time paths of y and w so as to maximize the present discounted value of the
ﬂow of proﬁts.
The ﬁrm’s current value Hamiltonian is
H = Pt(yt  wt) c(yt;Rt) ltyt +µtwt;
where lt and µt are the current-value shadow prices of reserves and inventories, respectively. Pon-




 lt = 0; (5)
Pt  µt
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
> 0 ) wt =  ¥ if St > 0; wt = 0 if St = 0
= 0 ) wt is indeterminate.
< 0 ) wt = yt
(6)
In principle, it is possible for the ﬁrm to liquidate some of its inventories by choosing w =  ¥. As
such action would radically depress market price it can be ruled out by market clearing. On the
other hand, if the ﬁrm does not hold inventories then w  0 (i.e., there are no inventories to sell
from). Moreover, since as a general rule oil ﬁrms do not stockpile all their extraction, it seems the
ﬁrst branch is empirically implausible. I therefore proceed assuming the ﬁrm’s optimal time path
4of w is based on the middle branch of (6), unless it never pays to acquire inventories.2
In addition to the ﬁrst-order conditions above, the solution must satisfy the equations of
motion for the shadow values:




˙ µ = rµ; (8)
where r is the interest rate. It is apparent that the solution to the differential equation governing µ
is an exponential, with that shadow value growing at the rate r.
If the ﬁrm is actively extracting over an interval of time then one may time-differentiate eq.
























Suppose now that the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to add to inventories over a period of time. Then
the middle branch of eq. (6) applies; time-differentiating and combining with eq. (8), one infers
that price would then rise at the rate of interest. The conclusion is that prices must increase at the


























If this simple relation fails the ﬁrm will either sell all or none of its extracted oil. Since as a general
rule oil ﬁrms do not stockpile all their extraction, it seems the empirically likely outcomes are
either stockpiling (if eq. (10) holds) or no stockpiling (if it does not).
Intuitively, if the ﬁrm were to hold stockpiles, it would possess two classes of stocks,
inventories and in situ reserves. These stocks differ in terms of their extraction costs: inventories
can be costlessly used (since the extraction costs have already been paid), while reserves in the
ground are costly to extract. In this case, the optimal program must use up the lower cost reserves
ﬁrst. However, the only way inventories could exist in the ﬁrst place is if excess extraction were to
occur at some point in time, and so it follows that no inventories would ever be held.
It is worth reiterating that prices are deterministic in this context – i.e., the entire price path
is known. What is the implication of relaxing this assumption, allowing for stochastic prices?
3 A Model With Stochastic Prices
Now suppose that the spot price of oil follows a random process, where the ﬂuctuations in price
result from demand-side shocks. For concreteness I take this random process to be geometric
Brownian motion:3
dPt=Pt = µdt +sdz; (11)
6where dz is an increment from a standard Wiener process. Convergence of the model requires that
the trend in prices does not exceed r, the ﬁrm’s discount rate: µ < r.
The nature of the ﬁrm’s decision problem is similar to those studied by Pindyck (1980,
1982). At each instant the ﬁrm’s decision problem is governed by the level of its reserves, its
inventories and market price. For expositional simplicity I assume the ﬁrm chooses to actively
extract over the time horizon in question; allowing for the possibility the ﬁrm might wish to cease
extraction, or re-activate extraction, can be readily incorporated, though at the cost of some extra
complexity.4
Let V(t;Rt;St;Pt) denote the optimal value function when the ﬁrm is currently active at
instant t, with in situ reserves of Rt, inventories of St and market price equal to Pt. The fundamental







As in the deterministic case, the optimal extraction rate balances current rents against the shadow





t ;Rt) ¶V=¶R = 0; (13)
where y
t solves the maximization problem in (12). Also as in the deterministic case, the maximand
7in (12) is linear in wt. Thus, optimal adjustments to inventories satisfy
Pt  ¶V=¶S
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
> 0 ) wt =  ¥ if St > 0; wt = 0 if St = 0
= 0 ) wt is indeterminate.
< 0 ) wt = yt
(14)
As above, if Pt exceeds the shadow value of inventories, here measured by ¶V=¶S, the ﬁrm is
motivated to draw down its inventories as rapidly as feasible. If the shadow value of inventories
is larger than current price, all production is allocated to inventories. If Pt = ¶V=¶S, then wt is
indeterminate.
It is instructive to think of the ﬁrm as solving a sequence of problems. At each instant t,
the ﬁrm determines an optimal program, based on the current (and observed) demand shock. This
consists of extraction and inventory plans for each future instant that maximize the discounted
expected ﬂow of proﬁts, conditional on current demand, where the expectation is with respect
to the future stream of prices. This program is subject to the anticipation that reserves will be
exhausted at the terminal moment (Pindyck, 1980). Then in the next instant, a new demand shock
is observed and the ﬁrm re-optimizes.
In the analysis I conducted within the deterministic framework, the next step was to time-
differentiate the condition governing the optimal extraction rate. Here, however, the optimal ex-
traction rate will generally be a function of the stochastic variable P, as will the marginal value of
reserves. As a result, there is no proper time derivative for either side of eq. (13). The stochastic
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where I have omitted the time subscript where there will be no confusion.
In the deterministic case, one expects the time rate of change in marginal costs to be smaller
than the present value of current marginal cost.5 Unlike the deterministic case, however, marginal
costs can rise over time in the context of stochastic demand. Despite the overall tendency for pro-
duction to decline over time, on average, the stochastic nature of extraction can yield an increase in
anticipated marginal cost if the variation in extraction is sufﬁciently large, relative to the slope of
marginal costs. This occurs because the optimal extraction rate is subject to a stochastic inﬂuence,
which in turn means that marginal extraction cost will typically ﬂuctuate. If there is enough vari-
ation in the demand shock, this more than compensates for the reductions in extraction that will
occur on average.
From the discussion above, if the ﬁrm is to be willing to hold inventories then it must be the
case that Pt = ¶V=¶S. The analysis leading up to equation (12) in Pindyck (1980) can be applied





= r¶V=¶S. It follows that a necessary condition for the ﬁrm to








Intuitively, a ﬁrm holding a barrel of stockpiled oil has the option of selling it at instant
t or holding it for a brief period, and obtaining a capital gain. The opportunity cost of holding






. If the latter is not smaller than the former, there will be an incentive to stockpile some
ore (Pindyck, 1980, 1982). In light of eqs. (13), (15) and (16), it is apparent that there will be an
incentive to stockpile oil when the anticipated rate of change in marginal extraction cost just equals









































It may seem counter-intuitive that a ﬁrm holding both reserves and inventories would be
willing to simultaneously extract and stockpile, as in situ reserves are higher cost to develop than
are stockpiles. Indeed, such simultaneous activities cannot be part of an optimal program under
deterministic conditions. But this need not be the case in a stochastic environment. In particular, it
can pay the ﬁrm to use up its higher cost reserves ﬁrst, holding the lower cost reserves until a later
date when demand is stochastic (Slade, 1988). This is one interpretation of behavior in my model:
ﬁrms hold onto the lower cost inventory reserves, electing not to sell them until after the higher
cost (in situ) reserves are exhausted.6
To make further headway, I assume that extraction costs are given by the speciﬁc functional
























¶P2  r = 0: (18)
Let s2 satisfy eq. (18) as an equality. If s2  s2, the anticipated rate of change in marginal
extraction costs can equal the capitalized level of marginal costs. In such a scenario the ﬁrm has
an incentive to acquire and hold stockpiles of oil.
Themotiveunderlyinginventoryaccumulationhereis“productionsmoothing”(Abel,1985;
Arrow et al., 1958; Blanchard and Fisher, 1989). The idea is that when the production cost function
is convex, ﬁrms can lower the expected discounted ﬂow of costs by using inventories as a buffer, to
mitigate abrupt changes in production that are induced by ﬂuctuating demand. In the present case,
this motive is offset somewhat by the overall expected downward trend in production associated
with a non-renewable resource. Even so, the fundamental wisdom in the literature on inventories
can be applied here, given enough variability in demand.
4 Empirical Analysis
The model presented above leads naturally to an empirical investigation. For production smoothing
to motivate inventory holding, it must be the case that s2  s2. In order to test that condition, one
ﬁrst needs to identify the linkage between optimal extraction and the state variables P and R.
To identify the impact of these state variables upon extraction I utilize data available at the
U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA) website (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). There, one can
ﬁnd statistics on spot prices and U.S. crude oil reserves and production. There are three issues that
must be confronted. The ﬁrst issue is that data are only available at the aggregate level, whereas
the model above describes motivations to the individual ﬁrm. In light of my assumption that h = 2
11marginal costs are linear. Consequently, the aggregate results I discuss below map naturally into
ﬁrm-level implications.8
The second issue is the potential endogeneity of one of the key right-side variables, namely
price. To the extent that the endogenous variables in the regressions I report below, U.S. reserves
and production, do not inﬂuence the world price of crude oil, one can safely ignore the potential
endogeneity of price. This seems likely to be the case for at least two reasons. First, U.S. pro-
duction was a relatively small part of world production during the sample period, and so would
seem unlikely to have exerted much impact on global supply. The largest share of world produc-
tion occurred in 1986; between 1986 and 2008, the share of U.S. production in total world output
fell monotonically. By 2008 the U.S. produced less than 8.5% of world output. Second, Adelman
(1995) argues that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has played a sig-
niﬁcant role in determining price during my sample period. Since OPEC sets target prices, and
associated quotas, based on world market conditions, it seems implausible that they would adjust
their actions on the basis of U.S. producer behavior. This point also suggests that U.S. producer
behavior is unlikely to exert much inﬂuence on the world equilibrium price.
The third issue is that of data frequency: Reserves are reported annually, while spot prices,
production and stockpiles are reported monthly and annually.9 To match the data on reserves
with the monthly data on all other variables of interest, I use a strategy in the spirit of Chow and
Lin (1971) and Santos-Silva and Cardoso (2001). I ﬁrst note that, while the theoretical model I
presented above assumed zero net reserve adjustments, ˙ R+y=0, in practice these adjustments are
not identically equal to zero. This is because reserves are regularly adjusted as ﬁrms’ information
concerning their deposits is improved, or as new deposits are discovered. Improved information is
generally the result of “development drilling,” the practice of drilling additional wells to identify
12the size and scope of deposits. New deposits result from exploratory drilling. The EIA reports
the number of “development wells” and the number of “exploratory wells,” at both the annual and
monthly level. Because both current production and current development drilling can arguably
be inﬂuenced by current reserves, I use lagged values of these variables in the regression reported
below. Inaddition, onemightimaginethemagnitudeofdrillingcouldmatter. Theleft-sidevariable
in this regression is the change in reported reserves summed with production. While data are only
available to estimate this relation at the annual level, that relation ought in principle to also hold
true at the monthly level. I therefore start by estimating an empirical model of net reserve changes
using annual data, and then employ this regression model to produce synthetic data for reserves at
the monthly level. This latter data is then exploited, along with the monthly data on oil prices and
private inventories, to estimate production at the monthly level.
While data on reserves and production is available for many years, data on development
and exploratory drilling is only available after 1973.10 The sample period for this regression, then,
is comprised of the years from 1973 to 2010. Reserves, in millions of barrels, are reported as of
31 December in each calendar year; accordingly, I use the reported value for year t as the starting
reserves for year t +1, for each year in the sample. Table 1 reports the results of two regressions,
one that uses OLS (allowing for robust standard errors) and one that allows for serial correlation.
These results support the inclusion of the lagged number of development holes. The lagged num-
ber of exploratory holes and lagged volume of drilling, as measured by million of feet drilled, are
of questionable signiﬁcance in the OLS results; this regression explains roughly 22% of the vari-
ation in the left-side variable. In the regression that allows for serial correlation, lagged volume
of drilling is plainly signiﬁcant while the coefﬁcient on the lagged number of exploratory holes
remains borderline signiﬁcant. Further, the ﬁrst-order serial correlation coefﬁcient is relatively
13large, and this regression explains roughly 42% of the variation in the left-side variable. Combin-
ing these remarks, it appears that allowing for serial correlation provides the best overall model of
net changes in reserves.
Sincereservesarereportedannually, Iinterpolatepredictedreservesduringtheothermonths.
For each month, I form the ﬁtted value for the change in reserves, and sum this with reported ex-
traction. In any particular year, I apportion the observed change in reserves between the 12 months
in proportion to the variable just constructed. Under standard assumptions, this construct is an
unbiased estimator of the true (but unobserved) monthly levels of reserves. So long as the mea-
surement error implied by this process is uncorrelated with the disturbance in the regression model
formonthlyextractionlevels, thisapproachwillgenerateunbiasedestimatesofthemarginaleffects
of interest.11
The next step is to regress the ﬁtted value R, real spot pries P and private inventories on ob-
served oil production. The optimal level of production, as described in (13), should be determined
by a balancing of rents with marginal value of reserves. The latter could in principle depend on a
combination of prices , inventories and reserves. If marginal costs are inversely related to reserves,
optimal output will be proportional to the product of price and reserves, as well as the product
of reserves with marginal value ¶V=¶R. To this end, I regress linear and quadratic terms in R, as
well as interaction terms involving P;R and S12 upon y; this regression model can be interpreted
as a Taylor’s series approximation of marginal value multiplied by R. In light of the time-series
nature of the data, I allow for serial correlation. To enhance comparability of observations from
different months, I convert production into values per day (in millions of barrels). Table 2 presents
results from the regression analysis of extraction, for three combinations of variables. Regressions
1 and 2 include linear and quadratic effects for P and R, along with interaction effects including
14various combinations of P;R and S. Many of these variables are signiﬁcant in regression 1 (OLS).
That noted, the results from regression 2 indicate serial correlation is quite likely—the ﬁrst-order
parameter, rho, is very large. The signiﬁcance of various explanatory variables is less compelling
in this regression, with only P;PR;PR2;PRS and PR2S having statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
The speciﬁcation in regressions 1 and 2 allow the state variable S to play an important role in
¶V=¶R. But one might anticipate R and S entering the value function additively, as they are substi-
tute sources of sales. To investigate this possibility, I ran comparable regressions to 1 and 2 after
droppingthesevenvariablesinvolvingS; theseresultsarepresentedasregressions3and4. Thekey
point here is that dropping these explanatory variables leads to a substantial increase in summed
squared errors; indeed, the hypothesis that all coefﬁcients associated with variables including S are
jointly zero is easily rejected. The speciﬁcation in regression 1 also points to the possible lack of
stock effects in costs, in that variables and interactions not including R are present. But the results
from regression 2 run counter to this interpretation, as the only signiﬁcant variables involve R. To
delve further into this question, regressions 5 and 6 drop the ﬁve variables not including R. Here
again this revision to the regression equation signiﬁcantly raises the summed squared errors, and
the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients associated with variables including R are jointly zero is easily
rejected.
One might object that other factors such as technology, taxes and distribution costs might
inﬂuence extraction. As the regressions in Table 2 omit these variables, my results would be
suspect if these factors were correlated with my regressors. To check on this possibility, I reran
regressions 1, 3 and 5 allowing for yearly ﬁxed effects. Results are given in Table 3 (in the interest
of brevity I do not report the annual ﬁxed effects). As in the ﬁrst set of results, many variables
are statistically signiﬁcant in the regression that includes all variables, and the variations that omit
15regressors involving S or not involving R are not supported. In addition, the estimated coefﬁcients
are generally similar to those reported in Table 2, as are signs and signiﬁcance. Finally, the annual
ﬁxed effects tend to change over time, with positive effects for earlier years and negative effects
for more recent years. This suggests the omitted factors identiﬁed above might well matter.





which can then be used to calculate the implied value of s2 from eq. (18). I sue the parameter
estimates from regression 1 allowing for ﬁxed effects, though the broad pattern I describe below
holds for other speciﬁcations. There are induced values for each month in the sample, so rather
than list all these values I present a variety of statistics in Table 5, including the ﬁrst three quartiles,
mean, 90%, and standard errors. I report these values for three values of the real discount rates:
1%, 2% and 3%.
During the sample period, the variance in monthly real spot prices is .2086.13 It is notewor-
thy that the sample variance exceeds the mean and median level of s2 at each of the three discount
rates, as well as the value at the 75% for the small real discount rate. At the medium real discount
rate, the implied values of s2 exceed the estimated variance s2 for slightly less than 75% of the
observations. While this evidence is not overwhelming, I think it solidly supports the empirical
plausibility of production smoothing as a motive for holding oil inventories.14
Ofcourse, observingthatvariationsinpricearesufﬁcienttomotivateproductionsmoothing
does not imply there are no other potential explanations for inventory holding. One obvious pos-
sibility is that ﬁrms hold inventories in order to cash in on unanticipated price increases, whether
they extract more or not in the face of such price increases. Such an explanation has much in com-
mon with the idea that wild gyrations in crude prices are related to (and perhaps even caused by)
speculation. If such an explanation were correct, one would expect to see sharp increases in crude
16prices leading to clear reductions in inventories.
Figure 2 shows weekly changes in crude oil inventories and price levels, as ratios of their
respective values at the start of 1986 (when weekly data is ﬁrst available). Signiﬁcant movements
in the weekly changes in stocks occurred during the period from 1986 to 2000, despite the fact that
crude prices were relatively constant during that period. While the pattern of changes in stocks is
less pronounced after 2001, when crude prices started to rise, there is still no clear indication that
changes in stocks are more likely to be negative during periods of high prices.15 And while it does
appear that changes in crude stocks were less volatile after 2000, this does not indicate that agents
were more likely to speculate on price changes as spot prices increased. On balance, then, there
seems to be little evidence to suggest ﬁrms are holding stocks so as to make a killing when prices
rise dramatically.
Perhaps speculators held inventories in anticipation of rapidly rising prices, as opposed to
basing their decision on current price. If so, it seems plausible that such agents would take their
cues from existing futures markets. When futures prices were well in excess of current spot prices,
a situation referred to as contango, there would be a motive to buy and hold inventories. To get at
this hypothesis, I collected futures data from the EIA webpage, which lists data from four futures
contracts. The ﬁrst of these, “contract 1,” lists futures prices for delivery in the following month.
As this delivery could be within a week or so of the trading date, these futures prices can be very
close to current spot prices, particularly as the end of the month approaches. “Contract 2” lists
futures prices for delivery in the month after contract 1; “contract 3” is for delivery in the month
after contract 2, and “contract 4” is for delivery in the month after contract 3. following month.
Since the data from contract 1 seem less likely to produce conditions favorable to speculation,
especially at the end of the month, I based the analysis reported below on contract 2 data. Weekly
17data are available for spot prices, Futures 2 contract prices, and inventory levels from the ﬁrst week
in January, 1986 to the ﬁrst week in February, 2009.
Whilethepresenceofcontangosuggestspotentialbeneﬁtsfromspeculation, onealsoneeds
to take opportunity costs into account. Irrespective of the presence or absence of holding costs, the
‘buy and hold’ strategy ties up capital resources for a period of time; how long depends on how
long the speculator must wait before selling. Accordingly, for each date I calculated the number
of weeks until the start of the month in which the contract was to be exercised; this variable is
termed “week” in the results reported below. A literal interpretation would set the opportunity
cost of tying up capital would be equal to the present value of $1 received in the future week in
question. Under such a strict interpretation, one measure of the net beneﬁt from speculating would
be ln(Pt;T) = Tln(pt), where Pt;T is the price of a future contract at time t for delivery in T periods
and pt is the spot price in period t. Under this interpretation, a regression of changes in inventories
upon the regressors ln(Pt;T);Tln(pt), and T would yield coefﬁcients k1;k2 and k3, with k1 positive
and the other two negative; it would also explain much of the variation in stock changes. (A literal
interpretation of the coefﬁcients would be k2 =  (1+r)and k3 = c, where r is the market interest
rate and c is the unit cost of holding inventory for a week). A less strict interpretation would regress
changes in inventories upon the regressors ln(Pt;T=pt) and T, where presumably the coefﬁcient
on the former would be positive (reﬂecting the sensitivity of stockpiling decisions to potential
gains) and the coefﬁcient on T would be negative, reﬂecting the opportunity cost of tying up
capital while stockpiling. Alternatively, one might replace the log-ratio of futures to spot price with
the difference between future and spot price; the coefﬁcients would take similar interpretations.
In the results reported below, I refer to these regressions as ‘Regression 1,’ ‘Regression 2’ and
‘Regression 3,’ respectively.
18The results from these three regressions are collected into Table 5. Column 2-4 report re-
sults from, respectively, Regressions 1, 2 and 3; standard errors are listed in parentheses below the
corresponding point estimates. One is struck by the poor performance of each regression. Indeed,
the only variable that exerts a statistically signiﬁcant effect is the difference between future and
spot price, as reported in Regression 3; even here the signiﬁcance is only at the 10% level. None
of the three regressions explain any meaningful amount of the variation is inventory adjustments.
Overall, these results indicate that speculation had little to do with inventory accumulation during
the sample period.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I present a model of ﬁrm behavior when oil prices are stochastic. In this frame-
work, the ﬁrm has an incentive to hold inventories if prices are sufﬁciently volatile. Using data on
monthly crude prices and privately-held U.S. inventories, I ﬁnd evidence that there was sufﬁcient
volatility in crude prices over the period from January 1986 through December 2009 to motivate
inventory holding. By contrast, the evidence that ﬁrms held inventories to speculate on price move-
ments does not seem very strong. I believe the conclusion is that inventories are more likely to be
motivated by attempts to smooth marginal production costs than by speculative motives.
My model assumes that the entire cost of production is born at the deposit. In particular,
extracted oil can instantly and costlessly be delivered to market, and storage of inventories is
costless. These assumptions may be legitimately questioned as unrealistic. Shipping costs for
crude oil can be a signiﬁcant share of delivered price, and there is often an important lag between
extraction and sale. However, my central ﬁndings seem likely to be robust to each of these potential
19extensions.
Adding distribution costs to the model above has no major effects upon my central results.
While such an alteration lowers the expected gains from holding inventories, it has an equivalent
effect on current proﬁts. Correspondingly, the key comparison is between the capitalized value
of “distribution rents” (price less marginal distribution cost) and the expected rate of change in
distribution rents. If the unit cost of distribution is taken as constant, then my model may be
applied by interpreting price as distribution rent. This suggests smaller initial sales (and higher
initial price) in conjunction with slower growth of prices over time. Such an alteration reduces the
value of inventories, but not the ﬁnding that sufﬁcient variation in prices will induce ﬁrms to hold
stockpiles.
Adding storage costs to the model also leaves the central result unchanged. While the
presence of storage costs would make it less desirable to hold inventories, there can still be a
motive with sufﬁciently variable demand. The results in Table 4 suggest that demand is often
considerably more variable than required to motivate the holding of inventories. Thus, it seems
plausible that the results reported above are robust to storage costs.
It seems most plausible that there is a lag between extraction and sales, as crude oil must be
reﬁned prior to delivery of the ﬁnal good. An extension of the analysis to allow for such lags can
be constructed by distinguishing between the date of sales and the date of extraction. Abel (1985)
showed that competitive ﬁrms would generally have an incentive to hold inventories in the context
of lags between production and sales, to facilitate speculation. His results would seem applicable
here as well. Indeed, Blanchard and Fisher (1989) suggest that this motive may be at least as
important as the production smoothing motive in explaining inventories of most commodities.
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If the ﬁrm is to be willing to acquire and hold inventories it must be the case that ¶V=¶S = P.
Since market price is plainly independent of the ﬁrm’s reserves one has ¶2V=¶R¶S = 0, in which
case ¶y=¶S = 0 and the ﬁrst term on the right of eq. (20) vanishes. Substituting eqs. (20) and (21)
into eq. (19) then yields eq. (17) in the text.
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23Notes
1 A third explanation is that inventories might be held to insure against running out of the
key resource (the so-called “stock-out” motive). It is hard to believe this motive played a major
role in the U.S. oil industry, however: average daily input into U.S. reﬁners during the same period
was just over 14 million barrels per day, and never exceeded 16.5 million barrels per day. As
such, the stockpile of crude oil would have supplied all U.S. reﬁners for almost 20 days. This
point notwithstanding, the model I discuss below can be adapted to allow for a stock-out motive
by including delivery constraints. I discuss this extension in the conclusion.
2 If Pt < µt the ﬁrm would be inclined to sell all extracted oil along with any accumulated
inventories. If any inventories were held the ﬁrms sales rate would then be inﬁnite, which as I note
in the text would violate market clearing. But if the ﬁrm has never acquired any inventories there is
nothing to prevent Pt < µt. In fact, this is the most likely outcome in the deterministic framework.
3 While I assume geometric Brownian motion for analytic convenience, a number of previous
authors have made similar assumptions (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; Dixit and Pindyck, 1993;
Mason, 2001; Pindyck, 1980; Slade, 1988).
4 See Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Dixit and Pindyck (1993) and Mason (2001) for analysis
of such a model.
5 As rents rise at the rate of interest, while price generally rises less rapidly, it follows that
marginal costs must also rise at less than the rate of interest.
246 For example, in December of 2008 Royal Dutch - Shell PLC anchored a supertanker full of
crude oil off the British coast in anticipation of higher prices for future delivery.
7 With these assumptions ¶3c=¶y3 = 0. As ¶3c=¶y3 exerts a positive inﬂuence on the expres-
sion in eq. (17), one can argue that this assumption generates the least compelling case for holding
inventories.
8 As marginal costs are linear, results at aggregate level map naturally into results at the level
of the individual ﬁeld-reservoir. If one is willing to draw an analogy between individual ﬁeld-
reservoirs and ﬁrms these results are directly relevant to the model discussed in section 3 above.
9 In fact, spot prices are reported on a daily, weekly, monthly and annual basis.
10 Moreover, there was an idiosyncratic (positive) change between 1969 and 1970, reﬂecting
the addition of Alaskan reserves. As these reserves were ﬁrmly in place before the period in
which monthly data is available, it seems best to restrict observations to the post-1970 period in
conducting the annual regression.
11 However, the approach will impact the standard errors. The results reported below are based
on robust standard errors, and so correct for this possibility. An alternative approach to the one I
use here is to estimate a relation between extraction and prices and reserves using annual data.
The disadvantage of using annual data is the corresponding reduction in number of observations.
A regression using annual data generates similar results to those reported in Table 2, in the sense
that estimated coefﬁcients have the same signs and are generally the same order of magnitude.
However, because production data are only available after 1985, only 25 annual observations are
available. With such a small data set there are very few degrees of freedom, and none of the
25coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant.
12 The EIA website reports various measures of inventories. Data on stockpiles are available
including or excluding the U. S. strategic petroleum reserve (SPR). As the SPR is both publicly
held, and hence motivated by political – as opposed to economic considerations – it seems clear
that the data excluding the SPR is preferable for my purposes. Netting out SPR holdings yields
a measure of private inventory holdings. One might legitimately object to this measure of private
inventories on the grounds it includes stocks held at reﬁneries or oil in pipelines. The ﬁrst of
these which are really more representative of raw materials in the production process, while the
second reﬂect oil in transit; neither of these seems representative of the sort of buffer stock my
model envisions. Accordingly, I use data on stocks held at ‘tank farms’, which do seem more
representative of the sort of inventories envisioned by the model.
13 Assuming that prices evolve according to geometric Brownian motion implies that prices
are log-normally distributed, i.e., the natural log of prices is normally distributed. During the
sample period, the mean and variance of the natural log of real monthly spot prices are 2.894 and
.2086, respectively.
14 As indicated in eq. (10), ﬁrms could be motivated to hold inventories even in the absence of
stochastic demand so long as the percentage change in production and the ration of production to
reserves matched up just right. To investigate this possibility, I formed the discrete time approxi-
mation to percentage change in production, Dyt=yt = (yt+1 yt)=yt and the ration of production to
reserves, yt=Rt, for each month t in the sample period. Assuming h = 2, the construct D=y+y=2R
would equal the interest rate. For the sample period, the average value of this construct is 4.2273,
26implying an interest rate of over 422%. Alternatively, one could run a linear regression of Dy=y
on y=2R; such a regression should yield an intercept of r=h 1 and a slope coefﬁcient of  1=h.
Performing such a regression yields estimated coefﬁcients -.0742 for r=h 1 and .00822 for  1=h.
Plainly, these results do not lend much support to the notion that ﬁrms would have been motivated
to hold inventories absent stochastic demand.
15 In fact, the average change in stocks was negative prior to 2000 (-216,726.2 barrels) and
positive after (179,228.6 barrels). This difference in average values, while intriguing, is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant: the corresponding standard deviations were two orders of magnitude larger.
Thus, there is no evidence of signiﬁcantly smaller values for changes in stocks as prices increased.
A similar patter emerges if one compares levels of inventories against price. During the sample
period there are dramatic swings in price, from below 50% of the initial level to over 550% of the
initial level. But even with these dramatic swings in price crude stock levels are always within
20% of the initial value. More to the point, there seems to be little evidence that stocks are drawn
down during times of particularly large prices, nor are stocks built up during periods of low prices.
27Figure 1: U.S. Petroleum Stocks
28Figure 2: Changes in Stocks and Prices
29Table 1: Net changes in reserves as a function of development and exploratory drilling
Regression
variable (1) (2)
lagged development holes .1666 .1489
(.0624) (.0520)
lagged exploration holes -1.489 -1.228
(.9247) (.7942)






Note: standard errors in parenthesis
number of observations = 38
30Table 2: Extraction as a function of price, reserves and inventories
Regression
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R .0036 .000062 .0053 .00031 .00028 -.00054
(.00081) (.00093) (.00072) (.00085) (.00023) (.000492)
R2 -6.56e-08 4.77e-09 -9.67e-08 1.7e-09 1.86e-09 1.60e-08
(1.54e-08) (1.83e-08) (1.38e-08) (1.69e-08) (4.52e-09) (1.02e-08)
P 10.32 -4.456 4.464 .7432 —- —-
(3.116) (2.551) (.5827) .5814
P2 -.0918 -.01590 -.0205 -.00938 —- —-
(.0252) (.0201) (.0052) (.00414)
PR -.00067 .00035 -.00036 -.000058 -.000052 -9.41e-06
(.000213) ( .00018) (.00004) (.000045) (7.98e-06) ( 6.74e-06)
PR2 8.17e-09 -7.01e-09 6.8e-09 1.01e-09 1.72e-09 8.44e-11
(3.56e-09) (3.0e-09) (7.83e-10) (8.45e-10) (3.0e-10) ( 2.40e-10)
P2R 4.32e-06 8.31e-07 1.0e-06 4.64e-07 1.38e-0 5.50e-08
(1.18e-06) (9.4e-07) (2.44e-07) (1.95e-07) (5.11e-08) (3.95e-08)
PS -.000061 .000028 —- —- —- —-
(.000021) (.000018)
PS2 1.13e-10 -1.9e-11 —- —- —- —-
(3.42e-11) (2.69e-11)
P2S 4.22 6.45e-08 —- —- —- —-
(1.3e-07) (1.09e-07)
PRS 3.31 -2.06e-09 —- —- 2.65e-10 1.88e-11
(1.24e-09) (1.09e-09) (5.13e-11) (4.51e-11)
PRS2 -5.41e-15 6.77e-16 —- —- -1.7e-16 -8.67e-17
(1.55e-15) (1.22e-15) (9.19e-17) (7.02e-17)
P2RS 1.21e-15 -3.36e-12 —- —- -5.0e-13 -1.87e-13
(6.09e-12) (5.08e-12) (2.88e-13) (2.29e-13)
PR2S -1.9e-14 3.95e-14 —- —- -7.96e-15 1.30e-15
(1.65e-14) (1.55e-14) (1.49e-15) (1.31e-15)
constant -40.49 2.767 -62.45 -.8895 -.1283 10.61
(10.27) (11.65) (11.59) (10.48) (2.889) (5.915)
r —- .926 —- .920 —- .924
SSE 17.44 4.869 20.36 5.327 21.787 5.088
R-squared .948 .685 .940 .674 .936 .676
Note: standard errors in parentheses
dependent variable: production, million barrels per day
number of observations = 289
*: signiﬁcant at 10% level
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level
***: signiﬁcant at 1% level
31Table 3: Fixed effects regression of extraction
Regression
variable (1) (2) (3)
R .00041 .00039 .00038
(.00062) (.000058) (.000044)
R2 -5.27E-09 -4.36e-09 -4.06
(2.43e-09) (2.34e-09) (1.65e-09)
P 3.862 .4060 —-
(2.481) (.2473)
P2 -0.06388 -.00124 —-
(.0179) (.00312)
PR -0.00023 -.000041 -.000016
(.00017) (.000018) (6.67e-06)
PR2 2.21E-09 9.43e-10 2.99e-10
(3.04e-09) (3.27e-10) (2.31e-10)
P2R 3.02E-06 7.86e-08 4.33e-08
(8.4e-07) (1.47e-07) (3.85e-08)
PS -.000026 —- —-
(.000017)
PS2 4.17E-11 —- —-
(2.53e-11)
SP2 3.26E-07 —- —-
(9.14e-08)
SPR 1.35E-09 —- 7.22e-11
(1.03) (4.62e-11)
S2PR -2.05E-15 —- -1.53e-16
(1.15e-15) (7.26e-17)
SP2R -1.53E-11 —- -1.45e-13
(4.27e-12) (2.23e-13)
SPR2 -5.23E-15 —- -1.08e-16
(1.54e-14) (1.28e-15)
SSE 5.907 6.510 6.322
Note: standard errors in parentheses
dependent variable: production, million barrels per day
number of observations = 289
*: signiﬁcant at 10% level
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level
***: signiﬁcant at 1% level
32Table 4: Implied lower bounds on variance in price
statistic ¶y=¶R y=R (¶2y=¶P2)(y=P2) s2(.01) s2(.02) s2(.03)
25% 0.000257 0.000195 0.0176 0.0297 0.0600 0.0918
mean 0.000275 0.000256 0.0527 0.0695 0.1417 0.2141
median 0.000281 0.000233 0.0261 0.0642 0.1295 0.1927
75% 0.000293 0.000333 0.0535 0.0922 0.1874 0.2825
90% 0.000300 0.000378 0.1111 0.1248 0.2577 0.3911
s.d. 0.000023 0.000117 0.0753 0.0525 0.1086 0.1649
note: s2(r) listed for annual discount rates: r = .01, r = .02 and r = .03
variance of monthly real spot price during sample period = .2086
Table 5: Analysis of Contango
variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
ln(Pt;T) -507.47 — —
(1037.9)
Tln(pt) 85.619 — —
(169.17)
ln(Pt;T=pt) — 5981. —
(4518.6)
Pt;T   pt — — 248.36*
(142.35)
T -269.46 5.6496 4.6642
(559.79) (93.293) (93.24)
constant 1614.0 11.8372 4.7097
(559.79) (574.37) (573.31)
R2 .0002 .275 .0025
number of observations = 1205
*: statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level
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